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Abstract
I study large random assignment economies with a continuum of agents and a nite
number of object types. I consider the existence of weak priorities discriminating among
agents with respect to their rights concerning the nal assignment. The respect for
priorities ex ante (ex-ante stability) usually precludes ex-ante envy-freeness. Therefore
I dene a new concept of fairness, called no unjustied lower chances: priorities with
respect to one object type cannot justify di¤erent achievable chances regarding another
object type. This concept, which applies to the assignment mechanism rather than to
the assignment itself, implies ex-ante envy-freeness among agents of the same priority
type. I propose a variation of Hylland and Zeckhausers (1979) pseudomarket that meets
ex-ante stability, no unjustied lower chances and ex-ante e¢ ciency among agents of the
same priority type. Assuming enough richness in preferences and priorities, the converse
is also true: any random assignment with these properties could be achieved through
an equilibrium in a pseudomarket with priorities. If priorities are acyclical (the ordering
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of agents is the same for each object type), this pseudomarket achieves ex-ante e¢ cient
random assignments.
Keywords: Random Assignment; Fairness; Stability; School Choice.
1 Introduction
In 1979, Hylland and Zeckhauser proposed a pseudomarket mechanism that solved the ex-ante
e¢ cient random assignment problem. This result could be compatible with ex-ante envy-freeness
should the agents face identical budgets. From Thomson and Zhou (1993) it was understood that
any ex-ante e¢ cient and envy-free random assignment could be obtained through a pseudomarket
with identical budgets in large economies (continnum of agents). This paper constitutes an extension
of pseudomarkets to environments where priorities, or agentsrights concerning the nal assignment,
exist that have to be respected.
Concerns about justice and e¢ ciency arise in many assignment problems. Examples include the
assignment of children to public schools, students to college residences, patients to public health
care services, etc. In this paper, I consider the fact that the existence of priorities in many assign-
ment problems precludes standard fairness desiderata such as the absence of ex-ante envy (i.e. no
agent should prefer any other agents assignment probabilities to her own) from being achievable.
Therefore I construct a weaker notion of fairness that is compatible with the respect for priorities.
It is based on the idea that priorities with respect to one object type cannot justify di¤erences in
chances with respect to another object type. I call it no unjustied lower chances. I propose a vari-
ation of the pseudomarket mechanism à la Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) that respects priorities
while meeting the new fairness condition. Under acyclical priority structures, that is, when agents
are equally priority-ordered with respect to every object type, this pseudomarket achieves ex-ante
e¢ cient random assignments.
The presence of priorities is a recurrent feature in assignment problems. An agent has priority
over another agent with respect to an object type when a unit of this object type must be given
to the former rather than the latter if both agents claim for the same unit. Examples of priorities
are those given by the presence of a sibling at and living at walking distance from the school in
children-to-school assignment problems, seniority and existing tenants in residence assignment and
medical emergency in health care services. Respect for priorities is understood as the stability of
any ex-post (or nal) assignment. The term stability, from the marriage market literature (Gale and
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Shapley, 1962), indicates that an agent with priority over another agent for some object type must
obtain a unit of that object type or a preferred one in the case that the latter agent obtains a unit
of that object. Since priorities could be regarded as privileges with regard to the nal assignment,
ex-ante envy-freeness cannot be guaranteed.
The new concept of fairness I propose here, no unjustied lower chances, a¤ects the assignment
mechanism itself rather than the random assignment. It states that any agent should be able to
obtain, if she wishes, at least the assignment probabilities of any other agent, ignoring those object
types for which the latter has priority over the former. More formally, for each feasible random
assignment, the assignment mechanism provides each agent with a menu of assignment probability
vectors from which the agent freely chooses. According to the proposed concept, this menu should
include any other agents assigned probabilities (or higher), ignoring the object types for which the
latter has priority over the former. This concept implies ex-ante envy-freeness among agents of the
same priority type (i.e. those who have equal priority levels for each object type).
In this paper, I propose a pseudomarket with priorities, a variation of Hylland and Zeckhausers
suggested mechanism where the prices each agent pays depending on her priority type. For each
object type, the priority type of an agent can be summarized into one of the following three statuses:
guaranteed, pivotal and banned. Guaranteed agents pay zero price, pivotal agents pay the market
price and banned agents pay an innite price. A stable nal assignment always arises from any
equilibrium in a pseudomarket with priorities. Moreover, a pseudomarket with priorities guarantees
no unjustied lower chances. It also obtains ex-ante e¢ cient random assignments among agents of
the same priority type.
In some scenarios, priority orderings coincide across object types. That is, priorities are acyclical.
Seniority rights in residence assignment, or low-income priorities in school choice, are examples of
such a priority structure. In such cases, a pseudomarket with priorities can be understood as a
sequential pseudomarket : those agents with the highest priority level attend the pseudomarket, buy
their assignment probabilities and leave; then those with the second-highest priority level attend the
pseudomarket for the remaining object units, and so on. A sequential pseudomarket obtains ex-ante
e¢ cient random assignments. The reason is that the price discrimination is such that no agent of a
higher priority type would have an incentive to trade with agents of lower types.
Related literature and comments.
The debate: Since the seminal paper by Abdulkadiro¼glu and Sönmez (2003), there has been
a lively debate on the relative value of the assignment mechanisms that are used in practice. Most
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of the interest has been centered on school choice mechanisms (i.e. the assignment of children
to public schools), and more specically on the comparison between strategy-proof mechanisms
(with truth-telling as weakly dominant strategy) such as Deferred Acceptance and non-strategy-
proof mechanisms such as the Boston Mechanism.1 The strategic simplicity of Deferred Acceptance
inspires both a justice argument (protection of naïve agents, see Abdulkadiro¼glu, Pathak, Roth and
Sömez, 2006, and Pathak and Sönmez, 2008) and also an e¢ ciency argument (avoiding coordination
failures, see Ergin and Sönmez, 2006) against non-strategy-proof mechanisms.2 However, strategy-
proofness may come at too high a cost in terms of ex-ante e¢ ciency, as evidenced in Abdulkadiro¼glu,
Che and Yasuda (2008), Miralles (2008) and Abdulkadiro¼glu, Che and Yasuda (2009). Some non-
strategy-proof mechanisms such as the Boston Mechanism and related mechanisms achieve better
qualitative ex-ante e¢ ciency results because they impose some market (or trade-o¤) incentives.
Inspired by this idea, I consider here how we can combine market incentives with respect for priorities.
Justice and e¢ ciency: The main recent reference is the survey by Thomson (2007). For
large economies with a continuum of agents, Varian (1976) and Zhou (1992) provide general results
relating fairness and e¢ ciency to Walrasian markets with equal endowments. Varian assumes strictly
concave preferences and Zhou analyzes strictly positive consumption sets. Both authors conclude
that the set of fair allocations coincides with the set of allocations arising from Walrasian market
equilibria with equal endowments.
The no-envy requirement is one of several concepts of justice that one could use. Egalitarian
equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978), that is, everyones indi¤erence to some (not necessarily
feasible) equal split allocation, could alternatively have been chosen among other concepts. Thomson
and Zhou (1993) give a wide result on that subject: all egalitarian (with respect to equal split),
consistent (i.e. holding for any subset of agents) and e¢ cient allocations are obtained by Walrasian
markets with equal endowments, even if preferences are satiated. I easily extend that result to the
kind of assignment problems I analyze. Assignment probabilities are the goods in this economy.
The fact that probabilities must add up to one could be modeled as a case of satiation. In this
1Both mechanisms are ranking mechanisms in that parents (the agents) are rst requested to submit a ranking over
the schools (the object types). The assignment algorithm uses the provided information in several rounds. In the rst
round, students are considered for the schools parents ranked rst. In schools with excess demand some students are
rejected (following priority criteria and tie-breaking lotteries) and go to the next round, where they are considered for
the schools that were ranked in second position. Accepted students are denitely accepted in the Boston Mechanism,
whereas in Deferred Acceptance they are only reconsidered for that school in the next round. The algorithms likewise
follow a nite number of rounds until all students are nally accepted at some school.
2For these reasons, the Boston Mechanism was replaced by Deferred Acceptance in Boston (!).
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economy, ex-ante envy-freeness is equivalent to consistency and egalitarian equivalence with respect
to equal split. Thus, among agents of the same priority type, ex-ante envy-freeness and e¢ ciency
are obtained through a Walrasian market with equal endowment and priority-dependent prices. The
pseudomarket with priorities I propose meets these properties.
Ex ante and ex post: The importance of ex-ante e¢ ciency (in which random assignments are
compared to each other) compared to ex-post e¢ ciency (where nal assignments are compared) is
stressed when priorities are rather coarse, that is, when massive sets of agents belong to the same
priority type. An example is the case of elementary school choice in Boston, where there are only
four priority categories (combining sibling and walking zone priorities) for more than one thousand
new entrants a year. Priority ties are typically solved by some sort of lottery and thus we talk
about random assignments when this uncertainty has not yet been resolved. In this context, ex-
ante e¢ ciency is a renement of ex-post e¢ ciency. Since any feasible random assignment could be
understood as a lottery over feasible sure assignments, it is easy to see that no ex-post e¢ ciency
implies no ex-ante e¢ ciency. The converse is not true. An example is the mechanism known as
random serial dictatorship, in which agents are strictly ranked according to an even lottery, and
then the top-ranked agent picks a unit from her most-preferred object type, the second-ranked
agent picks among the available units, and so on. This mechanism always obtains ex-post e¢ cient
assignments. However, it can be shown that it is ex-ante ine¢ cient (see for instance Bogomolnaia
and Moulin, 2001).
Ex-ante envy-freeness is however a weaker concept than ex-post envy-freeness. In e¤ect, a random
assignment could be ex-ante, yet not ex-post, envy-free, whereas the absence of ex-post envy implies
its absence ex ante. However, the concept of ex-post envy-freeness is so tight that it could either
be unattainable or yield non-sensible assignments. For instance, if an object type is popular (i.e.
the number of agents who prefer it over every other object type exceeds the number of units of this
type), then ex-post envy-freeness implies that no unit of that object type could be assigned to any
agent who prefers it. In a similar way, the concept of no unjustied lower chances makes sense only
when applied to assignment probabilities. In conclusion, the ex-ante approach to e¢ ciency and no
envy seems recommendable, and this motivates my focus on random assignments.
Priorities and fairness: In several cases, priority structures are designed to provide agents
with a chance to prove the intensity of their preferences. In school choice, having a sibling at the
school and living nearby is positively correlated with the parentspreference for the school, and this
justies giving priority on the basis of these variables for the sake of a more e¢ cient allocation.
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Similarly, previous tenants may have a preference for staying where they are, concerning residence
allocation. Nevertheless, in many other cases priorities arise for other reasons. As an example,
the San Francisco school authority gives priority to those applicants who "depart more" from the
average pool with respect to some socioeconomic indicators, in order to lessen the concentration
of minority students in a few schools. My results in this paper indicate that when priorities are
single-ordered (e.g. seniority rights), it is possible to obtain a random assignment satisfying ex-post
stability, no unjustied lower chances and ex-ante e¢ ciency. In the literature on ex-post assignments
(e.g. Ergin, 2002), single-ordered priority rules or similar requirements (e.g. "one step away from
single ordering") are also needed to satisfy justice and e¢ ciency properties.
More centrally related to the present paper is the recent work by Kesten and Ünver (2010).
Acknowledging the need to respect priorities, they conceive a weak notion of fairness which they
call no ex-ante discrimination. There is ex-ante discrimination of an agent with respect to another
agent and a certain object type if: 1) both agents are at the same priority level concerning that
object type, 2) the former agent obtains lower chances than the latter to be assigned an unit of that
object type, and 3) the former agent has positive probability to be assigned an unit of an object
type that is less preferred to the previous object type. It is a sound concept of fairness in that
agents with same priority level for some object type should have the same chances with respect to
that object type unless there is "enough" compensation. Moreover, it implies ex-ante envy-freeness
among agents of the same priority type. Based on that concept, the authors propose a modication
of the Deferred Acceptance algorithm that meets ex-ante stability and no ex-ante discrimination
while Pareto-dominating all other assignments meeting the same conditions.
Nevertheless, the concept of no ex-ante discrimination is not exempt of discussion. A rst point
is, what they understand as "enough compensation" (not being possibly assigned a worst object
type) is not the only way to conceive it. For instance, "enough compensation" could just mean that
the probability of being assigned to the considered object type or a preferred one should not be less
that the probability that the other agent has to be assigned to that object type.
A second point is that this concept of justice could come at a high price in terms of (ex-ante)
e¢ ciency. Consider the extreme case where there is only one priority level for all schools, that is,
the no-priority case. In such an environment, and with a continuum of agents, any ex-ante envy-
free and e¢ cient random assignment is obtained through a pseudomarket with equal budgets (once
again citing Thomson and Zhou, 1993). However, no ex-ante discrimination is tighter than no ex-ante
envy, thus in many cases the pseudomarket assignments are precluded and ex-ante e¢ ciency is not
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achievable. A simple example contains three object types a; b; c with equilibrium prices 3=2; 1=2; 0
respectively. Agents have unit budgets. Depending on preferences, some agents would buy 2=3
probability at a and 1=3 at c, and some others would buy 1=2 probability at a and 1=2 at b. The
latter agents prefer a to b, otherwise buying sure assignment at b would have been a better option.
Consequently, the latter agents would be ex-ante discriminated with respect to the former agents
and object type a. The alternative notion of fairness proposed here, no unjustied lower chances, is
intead compatible with these pseudomarkets.
Priorities and property rights: A last observation concerning the presence of priorities is
the fact that they could be considered as externalities. It could then be conceivable, à la Coase, to
convert the priorities into property rights and to let then the agents trade them (Abdulkadiro¼glu and
Sönmez, 2003). However, apart from legal issues (this procedure does not guarantee ex-post stability,
and unstable assignments have been legaly disputed), other theoretical concerns arise here. First
of all is the question on how priorities are converted into property rights, that is, into probability
endowments that agents trade. Even thoguh a satisfactory answer is possible, a second concern
arises when assignment probabilities are traded instead of bought using "fake" monetary income.
Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) have argued that a pseudomarket equilibrium may not exist if agents
trade probability endowments. Key in their argument is the fact that each agent ends up with a
probability bundle that must add up to one. As an example, consider an environment with two
object types a and b where a set of agents who prefer a to b are given an endowment of a sure
assignment (probability 1) to b. As long as the price of b lies below the price of a, these agents
cannot trade probabilities of b for probabilities of a (demanded probabilities would not add up to
one). As soon as the prices equal each other, however, these agents trade all their endowment for a
sure assignment at a. This generates an hemi-discontinuity in aggregrate demand, thus Kakutanis
xed-point theorem may not apply. The example could be easily extended to scenarios with more
than two object types.
The paper is structured as follows. The second section presents the assignment problem with and
without priorities, and the concepts of justice and e¢ ciency are brought into play. The third section
introduces and analyzes an extended version of Hylland and Zeckhausers (1979) pseudomarkets.
The fourth section presents the results and discussion. The last section concludes.
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2 The (random) assignment problem
There is a nite set S of J > 2 object types S = f1; :::; Jg. For simplicity I assume that there is no
outside option.3 Each object type j has capacity mass j > 0. The total sum of capacities across
object types is at least 1. Let ~ = (1; :::; J). There is a mass 1 of agents x 2 X  [0; 1] where
X is the set of agents endowed with the Lebesgue (uniform) measure . There is a measurable von
Neumann-Morgenstein (vNM) valuation function v : X ! V  RJ+, where v(x) = (v1(x); :::; vJ(x))
denotes agent xs valuations for object types 1 to J . Each agent is indi¤erent between any two
units of the same object type. The function is assumed to have a range that intersects with any
positive ray from the origin (i.e. all relative preferences belong to the image). It is also assumed
that (fx 2 X : v(x) 2 V 0g) = 0 whenever dim(V 0) < dim(V ).4
A random assignment is a measurable function q : X ! (S), where q(x) = (q1(x); :::; qJ(x))
denotes agent xs assignment chances for object types 1 to J . A random assignment q is feasible at
(v;~) if
R
X
q(x)d  ~. An (ex-post or nal) assignment is a measurable function a : X ! S. Let A
be the family of all feasible nal assignments (i.e. the mass of agents who are assigned to each object
type j does not exceed j). By the Birkho¤ - von Neumann theorem, any feasible random assignment
can be implemented as a (not necessarily unique) lottery l 2 (A) over feasible assignments. In
some results, we select l such that it puts positive weight only on those nal assignments a whose
assignment frequencies coincide with the random assignment probabilities: 8X 0  X; (X 0) > 0;R
X0 a(x)d =
R
X0 q(x)d. This is regarded as the frequency-probability condition. Let F denote the
set of all feasible random assignments (which obviously depends on ~).
Each agent xs expected payo¤ from the random assignment q is equal to q(x)  v(x). A feasible
random assignment is ex-post e¢ cient at (v;~) if it can be implemented as a lottery over Pareto-
optimal assignments. That is, for any possible lottery outcome, the resulting assignment is Pareto-
optimal. A feasible random assignment is ex-ante e¢ cient at (v;~) if there is no other feasible
random assignment at (v;~) that provides each agent with a weakly higher expected payo¤ and a
positive-measure set of agents obtains a strictly higher payo¤. Ex-ante e¢ ciency implies ex-post
e¢ ciency, but the converse may not be true. The concept could be extended to groups: for instance,
q is ex-ante e¢ cient within X 0  X if there is no feasible reassignment a¤ecting only agents in X 0
such that there is a Pareto-improvement.
A random assignment q is ex-ante envy-free if for any x; y 2 X; q(x)  v(x)  q(y)  v(x). An
3The results presented here could easily be extended to include that option.
4 I am abusing notation: the dimension of a set is in reality taken with respect to the closure of its interior.
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assignment is envy-free if for any x; y 2 X; va(x)(x)  va(y)(x). A random assignment is ex-post envy
free if for any lottery outcome, any nal assignment is envy-free. Ex-post envy-freeness implies ex-
ante envy-freeness. However, it is easy to see that ex-post absence of envy is too a harsh condition.
For any set of agents preferring the same object, either none or all of them have to be assigned to
that object type. A within-groups version of the envy-freeness denition could also apply here.
A priority structure is a function P : X !  
Y
j2Sf0; :::; Gjg, where P (x) = (P1(x); :::; PJ(x))
denotes agent xs priority type with respect to object types 1 to J , and Gj 2 N is arbitrarily large.
We say that agent x has priority over agent y with respect to object type j if Pj(x) > Pj(y). The
triple (v;~; P ) denes the economy. Let  2  denote a generic priority type,  = (1; :::; J), and
let X be the set of agents of priority type . In some result we will use the following assumption:
Denition 1 The priority structure P satises the priority-bridge condition if for any pair ; 0 2
; (X); (X0) > 0; and for any triple i; j; k 2 S such that i > 0i; j = 0j and k < 0k; there
exists 00 2 ; (X00) > 0; such that i = 00i ; j = 0j = 00j and 0k = 00k.
So if two priority types are tied with respect to some object type, and one priority type has
higher priority with respect to a second object type while the other priority type has higher priority
with respect to a third object type, then there is a "bridge" priority type which has the highest
priority of the two in both three object types. The priority structure is required to be rich in that
sense. A particular case of a priority structure satisfying the priority-bridge condition would be the
join-semilattice structure: for any pair ; 0 2 ; (X); (X0) > 0; we have (X_0) > 0.
Furthermore, we will impose an assumption on the preference prole in some of the results. In
words, the assumption states that all preferences are possible regardless the priority type.
Denition 2 The economy (v;~; P ) satises the preference-richness condition if for any  2 
such that (X) > 0;we have v(X) = V .
We say that an assignment a is stable (or it respects priorities) given P if 8x; y 2 X;Pj(x) > Pj(y)
and a(y) = j =) va(x)(x)  vj(x). A random assignment is ex-post stable if it can be dened as a
lottery l 2 (A) whose support is constituted by stable assignments. Following Kesten and Ünver
(2010), a random assignment q is dened as ex-ante stable given P if and only if 8x; y 2 X; fPj(x) >
Pj(y) and qj(y) > 0g =) fqi(x) = 0 8i 2 S : vi(x) < vj(x)g. That is, if agent x has priority over
agent y with respect to object type j and y obtains chances of being assigned to j, then x cannot be
possibly assigned to an object type that is less preferred than j. Ex-ante stability implies ex-post
stability. For the converse, the frequency-probability condition is needed.
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Lemma 1 Under the frequency-probability condition, a random assignment q is ex-post stable given
P if and only if it is ex-ante stable given P .
I omit the easy proof given the frequency-probability condition. In words, when an agent with
lower priority status for some object type obtains a positive probability of being assigned to that
object type, no agent with a higher priority level can be assigned to a strictly less preferred object
type (her assignment probabilities must weakly rst-order stochastically dominate a sure assignment
to that object type). It can be seen that the absence of envy and ex-post stability are generally
incompatible features. From now on I will restrict attention to ex-ante stability, taking into account
that the frequency-probability condition extends to ex-post stability. It can be seen that the absence
of envy and ex-post (or ex-ante) stability are generally incompatible features. Hence, I propose a
new and weaker notion of envy-freeness that could be compatible with the respect for priorities.
First, let us dene a (reduced-form) mechanism as a correspondence Q : X  F  (S).
Obviously, this is not a standard (nor even precise) denition of a mechanism. It could be understood
as a reduced form of a game, where q is given by the strategy prole and Q is given by the agents
achievable assignment probability vectors given the other agentsstrategies and her own strategy
space. Q(x; q) is understood as the menu o¤ered to agent x given the feasible random assignment
q. In the pseudomarket analyzed in this paper, an agents menu consists of her budget set. An
optimal choice set C(Q(x; q)) is the set of elements in Q(x; q) maximizing xs expected utility. q is
an equilibrium random assignment if q(x) 2 C(Q(x; q)) for almost every x 2 X. Let Q denote
the set of equilibrium random assignments under Q. Although I skip notation, it is understood that
this set depends on the mechanism and on the analyzed economy.
Second, 8x; y 2 X; and dening Syx  fj 2 S : Pj(y) > Pj(x)g; the set of object types for which
y has priority over x, consider the transformation (x; y; q) dened as j(x; y; q) = qj(y) if j =2 Syx,
j(x; y; q) = 0 if j 2 Syx. That is, this transformation is the vector of ys assignment probabilities,
ignoring those object types for which y has priority over x.
Denition 3 A random assignment reduced-form mechanism Q satises no unjustied lower chances
given P if for almost every x; y 2 X and 8q 2 Q; 9~q(x) 2 Q(x; q) such that (x; y; q)  ~q(x).
In other words, it is required, following the denition, that priorities with respect to some object
types shall not justify better chances concerning any of the other object types. Each agent must
have (if she wishes) the chance to obtain at least as much as any other agent, ignoring the object
types for which the latter has priority over the former. If P is constant across a group of agents, this
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concept implies ex-ante envy-freeness inside this group (given that agents make optimal choices). In
the next section, I extend the pseudomarket mechanism proposed by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979)
to a version that satises ex-ante stability, no unjustied lower chances and ex-ante e¢ ciency within
each priority type group.
3 Pseudomarkets
Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) proposed this solution for the assignment of workers to positions more
than thirty years ago. They pointed out that even in environments without monetary incentives one
could create a fake numeraire good and use it as a means to partially elicit information on agents
preferences over the goods. What they propose is actually very simple: they endow each agent with
a budget of fake money and allow her to buy allocation probabilities for each object type. The
condition must be met that the purchased probabilities add up to 1. Each object type has its price
for each probability unit. A Walrasian market could be simulated that reaches a price equilibrium
such that all agents maximize their utilities given the budget constraint, and markets clear (the
aggregate demand of each object type does not exceed its supply). The authors nd that a price
equilibrium always exists,5 and that each equilibrium random assignment is ex-ante e¢ cient. If all
agents start from the same budget, any equilibrium outcome is also naturally envy-free.
This paper builds upon Hylland and Zeckhausers ideas. It generalizes the concept of a pseudo-
market to include the respect for priorities as a objective to accomplish. Unsurprisingly, the respect
for priorities entails priority-dependent prices, giving rise to what I call a pseudomarket with priori-
ties. Let a price matrix p be dened as an element of RJG+ , where R = R[ f1g, such that for each
j 2 S there is gj 2 f0; :::; Gg : pjg = 0 8g > gj ; pjg =1 8g < gj . Each g > gj will be regarded as a
guaranteed priority type for object type j, gj will be called pivotal priority type, and each g < gj will
be named a banned priority type for object type j. Each agent x is endowed with the same budget,
say 1. She faces her own price vector p(x) = (pjPj(x))j2S and buys the assignment probability vector
q(x; p) 2 (S) that maximizes q(x; p)  v(x) subject to q(x; p)  p(x)  1. q(x; p) is singleton for
almost every x 2 X. A pseudomarket equilibrium (with priorities) is a price matrix p such thatR
X
q(x; p)d  ~.
For any price matrix, each agents optimal consumption decision can be partially characterized.
5This cannot be guaranteed if agents are rst given actual assignment probability endowments and they are then
allowed to trade them. See Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979).
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Almost every agent x, given p(x), buys positive probabilities for at most two object types. Ideally,
given the linear utility form that serves to evaluate lotteries, any agent would choose to spend her
whole budget (or else buy sure assignment) on only one object type. The additional constraint
that the sum of purchased probabilities must be 1 forces the agent to acquire probabilities from a
back-up option. This back-up option must have a price lower than 1. A back-up option always exists
in equilibrium. Indeed, given that the overall supply of units is never less than its overall demand,
without loss of generality we can assume that there exists a "worst object type" w whose price could
be normalized to zero for every agent (all agents have guaranteed assignment at w). If the agent
does not spend her whole budget, it must be the case that she has bought a sure assignment to her
preferred object type.
Given the linear expected utility form, it is the case that almost every agent optimally chooses
among kink points in her budget set, thus the number of relevant choices is nite. At a kink point
in which agent x buys from object types i and j (the latter being the back-up option), it must be
the case that pi(x) > 1 > pj(x) and vi(x) > vj(x). Let us denote such a kink point lottery as ij.
Denoting Ox  fi 2 S : pi(x) > 1g (overdemanded, or una¤ordable, object types) and Ux  SnOx
(underdemanded, or a¤ordable, object types), there are at most (#Ox + 1)  #Ux relevant choices
for agent x. Moreover, it is easy to check that if agent x (weakly) prefers ij to hj and ij to ik,
she must (weakly) prefer ij to hk. That simplies the agents optimization algorithm. In sum, at
least in environments with innitely many agents, there exist reasons to believe that a pseudomarket
mechanism is not strategically cumbersome. This is important due to the current concern about
so-called naïve agents versus sophisticated ones (Pathak and Sönmez, 2008). One could also use a
direct mechanism in which agents are required to submit information about their preferences and
then the planner simulates a pseudomarket and assigns probabilities.
Lemma 2 For any economy (v;~; P ), a pseudomarket equilibrium (with priorities) p exists.
Proof. Given a vector of prices, the number of relevant (i.e. possibly best) consumption choices
is nite for each agent. Thus the pseudomarket could be modeled as a game with a continuum
of agents and a nite strategy space for each agent, embedding all singletons and pairs of object
types. Payo¤s are continuous on the vector of measures of priority-type/strategy tuples (i.e. for
each priority type, the measure of agents playing a specic strategy). Thus conditions apply to use
Theorem 2 in Mas-Colell (1984) and state the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Implementing the probabilities the pseudomarket assigns is certainly easy. Since almost every
agent buys from at most two object types, the assignment algorithm proceeds in two rounds. First
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notice that the agents could be classied into a nite number of sets according to their assigned
probabilities. Consider a set with mass ij of agents of priority type  who are assigned to object
type i with probability qij , and to object type j with probability 1   qij . Take a mass qijij of
units of object type i, and randomly assign them to the agents from that group. Those agents who
were not assigned to i go to a second round, where they are assigned to object type j. Do the
same for each group. Those agents who were indi¤erent among kink points and bought a convex
combination of them are randomly classied into one of the groups the kink point choices belong to,
with probabilities mimicking the weights of the convex combination.6
A nal note on pseudomarkets will clarify why it is not always correct to rst give agents property
rights over the assignment probabilities and then let them trade these rights. A simple example is
where there are only two object types. Since any agents purchased bundle of probabilities must
add up to one, those agents preferring the most expensive object type would not be able to buy
additional probability units of this object type. Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) have an example
in which no market equilibrium exists following this procedure, while an equilibrium always exists
when agents buy assignment probabilities out of a ctitious budget. Other discontinuity problems
arise if agents are given property rights over sure assignments. They will not trade against more
preferred but more expensive object types out of budgetary impossibility, and suddenly they will
trade all of their endowment as soon as the preferred goods become at least as cheap as the endowed
object types. In sum, by organizing a market with budgets instead of real endowments, one avoids
discontinuity problems and guarantees the existence of price equilibria.
4 Results
I list my results in this section. First I consider scenarios without restrictions on the priority
structure, where I establish the properties of the pseudomarket mechanism with priorities. Secondly,
I study scenarios with acyclical priorities. In these, if an agent has priority over some other agent
with respect to one object type, she does too for any other object type. With acyclical priorities,
the pseudomarket with priorities obtains overall ex-ante e¢ ciency properties.
6The implementation process is a bit more complex with a nite number of agents. Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979)
provided a solution in such a case.
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4.1 General case
In this subsection, I state and discuss the main result of this paper. The proposed pseudomarket with
priorities guarantees ex-post stability and satises some e¢ ciency and fairness properties discussed
in the preceding sections.
Theorem 1 For any economy (v;~; P ), the pseudomarket with priorities satises no unjustied
lower chances and obtains (in equilibrium) random assignments that are both ex-ante stable and
ex-ante e¢ cient among agents of the same priority type.
Proof. Ex-ante e¢ ciency within priority type: for each priority type , we can analyze a separate
economy in which a vector ~ =
R
X
q(x)d characterizes the supply side. For each such economy,
the price vector is identical across agents, therefore Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) applies here to
show that the pseudomarket generates ex-ante e¢ cient random assignments in equilibrium.
Ex-ante stability: consider a school j 2 S and two agents x; y 2 X such that Pj(x) > Pj(y):
If pj(y) = 1, agent y cannot buy probability units from that object type, and we are done. If
pj(y) < 1, it must be the case that pj(x) = 0. Then optimally x buys an assignment probability
vector that rst order stochastically dominates a sure assignment to j. Therefore it is impossible
that x ends up being assigned to a school that is less preferred than j.
No unjustied lower chances: consider two agents x; y 2 X and (x; y) as dened before. Almost
every y buys positive assignment probabilities from at most two object types. First, consider the
case in which y buys sure assignment for a unique object type j (therefore pj(y)  1). If j 2 Syx,
then (x; y) = ~0, and we are done. If j =2 Syx, then pj(x)  pj(y), hence a sure assignment to j is
also available to x. Second, consider the case in which y buys probabilities from two object types
i (pi(y) > 1) and j (pj(y) < 1). If both i and j belong to Syx, once again (x; y) = ~0, and we are
done. If neither belong, then pi(x)  pi(y) and pj(x)  pj(y), thus (x; y) is a¤ordable for x. If
only j 2 Syx, then pi(x)  pi(y): Consider the "worst object type" w whose price is zero for every
agent. In that case, x can a¤ord to buy at least (x; y) by spending her budget on i and completing
the bundle with w. Finally, consider the case where only i belongs to Syx. Then pj(x)  pj(y)  1,
and (x; y) is available to x (who can indeed buy a sure assignment to j).
A rst question with respect to this result is whether the converse is true. That is, whether
no unjustied lower chances, ex-post stability and ex-ante e¢ ciency within priority types can be
characterized by the equilibrium outcomes of the pseudomarket mechanism here proposed. It turns
out that the converse is not necessarily true. For any two agents x; y 2 X, dene Exy = Sn(Sxy[Syx),
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the set of object types for which both agents have the same priority level. Ideally, we would like no
unjustied lower chances to imply equal prices for Exy for both agents. However, if pj(y)  1 for
any j 2 Exy, this fairness property only implies pj(x)  1 (a¤ordability of sure assignments) for any
j 2 Exy.
Nevertheless, the converse becomes true if we add the priority-bridge and preference-richness
conditions.
Theorem 2 Given ~, x P satisfying the priority-bridge condition and consider the set 
  fv :
(v;~; P ) satises the preference richness conditiong. Then the following statement is true for any
v 2 
: any (equilibrium) random assignment generated by a mechanism satisfying no unjustied
lower chances that is both ex-ante stable and ex-ante e¢ cient among agents of the same priority
type can be generated by an equilibrium in a pseudomarket with priorities. If P is xed so that it
does not satisfy the priority-bridge condition, there exists v 2 
 such that the previous statement is
not true.
Proof. A mechanism satisfying no unjustied lower chances obtains (in equilibrium) random
assignments that are ex-ante envy-free among agents of the same priority type. Jointly with ex-ante
e¢ ciency within the set of agents of the same priority type, this allows me to invoke Thomson and
Zhou (1993): in equilibrium, the random assignment is generated by optimal consumption decisions
given a matrix of priority-type dependent price vectors (p())2 and an equal income 1 for every
agent. This is so because, once again, for each priority type , we can analyze a separate economy
with a set of agents X in which a vector ~ =
R
X
q(x)d characterizes the supply side.
I next show that ex-ante stability implies that for any school j 2 S and any two priority types
; 0 2  such that j > 0j , we must obtain (WLOG) the following double implication: pj(0) <
1 () pj() = 0. Consider pj(0) < 1; pj() > 0. Given the preference-richness assumption,
there is y 2 X0 that optimally buys positive probabilities for object type j. Now suppose pj() >
1. Consider the "worst" object type w that has zero price regardless the priority type. By the
preference-richness condition, some agent x 2 X will optimally buy positive probabilities of both
j and w while preferring j to w. This violates ex-ante stability when comparing x to y. Suppose
instead that pj()  1. If there is i 2 S such that 1 < pi() <1, by the aforementioned assumption
there will be x 2 X who will optimally buy positive probabilities of both i and w while preferring
j to w. This once again violates ex-ante stability when comparing x to y. If there is no such an i,
prices that are not higher than 1 could be normalized to 0 (including pj()), since the budget set
would not be a¤ected.
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In the next two paragraphs, I show that for any school j 2 S and any two priority types
; 0 2 X such that j = 0j , we must have (WLOG) pj() = pj(0). Let us suppose pj() > pj(0).
If pj() > 1, some agent x 2 X that prefers j to any other object type will be able to buy less
assignment probability at j than some agent y 2 X0 who optimally chooses to spend her budget
on j and completes her bundle with w (the "worst" object type, with zero price). This violates no
unjustied lower chances. If pj()  1, I consider several cases. First, if either x or y (or both)
is facing prices that are either not higher than 1 or 1, then these not-above-one prices could be
normalized making pj() = pj(0) with no alteration of the budget set (WLOG). Second, if there is
another object type h : h = 0h, ph() = ph(
0) > 1, (we must have ph() = ph(0) as seen before
in the case pj() > 1) then pj() > pj(0) implies, under the preference-richness assumption, that
some agent y 2 X0 optimally buys a bundle with 1 pj(
0)
ph() pj(0) >
1 pj()
ph() pj() probability units of
being assigned at h and the remaining probability at j. This bundle does not belong to the budget
set of agents in X, hence violating no unjustied lower chances.
Thus I consider a last set of scenarios where j = 0j and 9i; k 2 SnE0 : 1 > pi() > 1;
1 > pk(0) > 1, where E0  fh 2 S : 0h = hg. Here I use the priority-bridge condition imbedded
in the richness condition. There is a priority type 00 such that i; j 2 E00  fh 2 S : 00h = hg
and j; k 2 E000  fh 2 S : 0h = 00hg with a positive mass of agents of that type. By the previous
paragraph we must have both pj(00) = pj(0) and pj(00) = pj(0), contradicting pj() > pj(0).
The necessity argument is also seen here: if there were no such a 00, there would be a preference
prole v such that a vector of equilibrium prices exists satisng pj() > pj(0) (while all the stated
properties are met).
A second question here is whether the frequency-probability condition is relevant. This condition
provides some structure to ex-post assignments. It has to be said, though, that this condition reduces
the set of ex-ante assignments that are ex-post stable under a propery designed lottery over nal
assignments. Consider the following example with three object types a; b; c where a (with capacity
1/2) is preferred to b (with capacity 1/4) and b to c (with capacity 1/4) by every agent. There
is a measure 1/2 of agents of priority type  and another measure 1/2 of agents of priority type
0. The only di¤erence between  and 0 is that those agents of type  have priority over those of
type 0 with respect to object type b. Consider a random assignment in which all agents obtain the
same assignment probabilities 1/2,1/4,1/4 for a; b and c respectively. According to the frequency-
probability condition, this random assignment is not ex-post stable. However, consider an ex-post
implementation where with probability 1/2, all agents of type  are assigned to a and the other agents
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are randomly split between b and c, and with probability 1/2 all agents of type 0 are assigned to
a whereas those of type  are randomly split between b and c. All the ex-post assignments here
are stable. The example could be slightly modied to acommodate the richness assumption. This
suggests that a relaxation of the frequency-probability condition could enrich the analysis of ex-post
stable random assignments.
4.2 Acyclical priorities
Consider a specic priority structure P such that for any x; y 2 X; i; j 2 S; Pi(x) > Pi(y), Pj(x) >
Pj(y). This would be regarded as acyclical priorities, since there is a unique ordering among agents
that applies to all object types. One example in real scenarios could be the assignment of college
students to residences, where seniority may give priority. In these cases, I could then generally
talk about top-ranked agents, second-ranked agents and so on, with no mention of object types.
Let us dene a sequential pseudomarket in the following way: rst, top-ranked agents attend a
pseudomarket with equal budgets, buy their assignment probabilities at equilibrium prices and
leave; then, second-ranked agents attend a pseudomarket with equal budgets for the remaining
object units; and so on. It is easy to see that the sequential pseudomarket is equivalent to the more
general pseudomarket with priorities when these are acyclical.
Theorem 3 Fix an acyclical priority structure P . Under the frequency-probability condition, a
sequential pseudomarket guarantees stability and obtains ex-ante e¢ cient random assignments.
Proof. Let   0, and consider any x 2 X and any y 2 X0 . Consider any object type j from
which y buys assignment probabilities in the market equilibrium. Then it must be the case that
pj(x) = 0, since that object type was necessarily oversupplied for  ranked agents. This guarantees
ex-post stability, since x will optimally buy assignment probabilities from object types that are at
least as preferred as j. Since ex-ante e¢ ciency is guaranteed among agents of the same priority type,
potentially mutually benecial trade could only arise between priority groups. Once again, however,
no set of agents x 2 X could have an interest in trading with any set of agents y 2 X0 . All object
types from which any such y buys are (weakly) less preferred for x than the object types from which
x buys, since x is facing a zero price for the former goods. Note that any trade has to keep every
agent with assignment probabilities adding up to one.
Notice here that we have not mentioned the fairness condition proposed in this paper, no un-
justied lower chances. It turns out that this property is not informative here, since it holds only
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trivially. In fact, for  > 0, this property just implies that agents in 0 obtain a non-negative
assignment probability vector in the menu o¤ered, which is the budget set.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have analyzed large random assignment economies with a continuum of agents and a
nite number of object types. I have introduced the realistic assumption that some priority criteria
might alter the symmetry of agents in their rights regarding the nal assignment. Without these
priorities, ex-ante e¢ ciency and envy-freeness is characterized by the equilibrium outcomes from a
pseudomarket with equal budgets, à la Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), as pointed out by Thomson
and Zhou (1993). In a pseudomarket, each agent is endowed with a ctitious budget that allows
her to buy assignment probabilities, where each object type has its own price. In this paper, I have
proposed an extension of this pseudomarket mechanism that takes the existence of priorities into
account. For each object type, there is a priority level that is pivotal, that is, agents at that level
pay the market price. Agents at a higher priority level (guaranteed) pay zero price, and those at
lower levels (banned) pay innite price.
Once priorities are considered, ex-ante envy-freeness is typically not achievable. I have alterna-
tively searched for a notion of "maximal fairness" subject to respect for priorities. I have based this
notion on the fact that priorities regarding one object type cannot justify any privileges concerning
another object type, and I have named the observation of this desideratum no unjustied lower
chances. This property implies ex-ante envy freeness among agents of the same priority type. It
states that, for any feasible random assignment, each agent must be o¤ered a menu of assignment
probability vectors such that each other agents assignment probabilities (or higher) are included in
that menu, ignoring the objects for which the latter agent has priority over the former. It will be
noticed that this fairness condition not only a¤ects random assignment but also the process (the
mechanism) generating it. The menu is a reduced form of the assignment probabilities that the
agent can obtain given her strategy space and the other agentsstrategy prole.
In general scenarios where I do not impose any structure on priorities, I show that a pseudomar-
ket with priorities respects priorities (it is ex-post stable), guarantees no unjustied lower chances
and obtains ex-ante e¢ cient allocations among agents of the same priority type. Assuming enough
richness in preferences and priorities, the converse is also true: any random assignment with these
properties could be achieved through an equilibrium in a pseudomarket with priorities. If priorities
18
are constrained to be acyclical, that is, the ranking of agentspriority levels does not vary across
object types, then the pseudomarket with priorities can be implemented via a sequential pseudo-
market. In such a mechanism, agents with the highest priority level attend the pseudomarket, buy
their assignment probabilities and leave. Agents at the second-highest priority level attend the
pseudomarket for the remaining slots and leave. And so on. This sequential pseudomarket obtains
in equilibrium overall ex-ante e¢ cient random assignments, since agents from a higher priority type
would never have an incentive to trade their assigned probabilities with agents in lower priority
levels.
There are several other interesting features in assignment problems that have been skipped here
in order to obtain more concise results. Among them, the niteness of the number of agents,
and the presence of peer-group e¤ects on agentspreferences. The rst element is often found in
the theoretical literature. Following Hylland and Zeckhausers (1979) seminal work, the results
found in the present paper do not substantially di¤er from what we could expect in environments
with su¢ ciently many agents per object type. However, interesting departures from competitive
market behavior deserve more careful analysis, when the number of agents per object type is low
enough. For instance, in the children-to-school assignment problem, is the reasonable 25-30 new
students per school and year ratio su¢ ciently high? The answer will come from empirical evidence.
The second element I mention is specially interesting in that it has not received proper attention
from the theoretical literature despite the empirical evidence. It could be argued that a model
that incorporates peer-group e¤ects adds much more complexity to already cumbersome problems.
However, further inclusion of this feature is relevant since it may a¤ect what we know from the
mechanism I suggest in this paper and other mechanisms that have been suggested in the literature.
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